WINNER OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS ESSAY PRIZE 2013: The relations between agency, identification, and alienation by Hinshelwood, A
WINNER OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS ESSAY
PRIZE 2013
The relations between agency, identiﬁcation, and alienation
Alec Hinshelwood∗
Department of Philosophy, University College London, London, UK
This paper examines the relations between, on the one hand, accounts of the distinction
between an agent’s identifying with, as opposed to feeling alienated from, their attitudes;
and on the other, metaphysical accounts of action. It claims that a commitment to an
event-causal conception of agency, which would analyse agency in terms of the
causal potency of psychological states and events, appears to render mandatory a
particular style of account of identiﬁcation and alienation – namely, the hierarchical
model offered by Harry Frankfurt and Michael Bratman. It is argued that such
accounts fall foul of a dilemma: the Authority Problem. The failure of attempts to
avoid the Authority Problem is then used to motivate an attractive alternative style of
account of the distinction, offered by Richard Moran. However, it is pressed that
Moran’s account rests on claims about agency which seem incompatible with the
event-causal conception of agency. By making the links between the metaphysics of
agency and accounts of identiﬁcation and alienation more explicit, the paper allows
us to better comprehend both the apparent need for and characteristic failures of some
traditional accounts of identiﬁcation and alienation, as well as make clear the action-
theoretical debt incurred by those who would offer an alternative.
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1. Introduction
It is possible for a person to harbour certain attitudes or experience certain emotions while
yet feeling as if they are not, in some sense, really theirs. I shall refer to this phenomenon as
alienation. Given that alienated mental states occur within a person’s psychic life, there is a
weak sense in which they are all states of theirs; nevertheless, there is a stronger sense of
ownership that it is possible for a person to enjoy with respect to their mental life. Following
Harry Frankfurt, I shall say that a person enjoys the latter kind of ownership over their atti-
tudes if they are attitudes with which they identify.1 It is this kind of ownership which is
absent when an agent feels alienated from an attitude.
For the most part philosophers have discussed the notions of identiﬁcation and alienation
in connection with issues in moral psychology, for instance, in connection with questions
about character and identity, as well as questions about moral responsibility. Whilst I do not
challenge the idea that there might be important links between the aforementioned topics
and the distinction between identiﬁcation and alienation, in this paper I want to focus on the
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distinction itself – treating those other topics as downstream ofmy own.Moreover, my central
contention is that we must re-assess the metaphysics of agency which is upstream of the dis-
tinction between identiﬁcation and alienation.Bymaking the links between themetaphysics of
agency and accounts of identiﬁcation and alienationmore explicit, I hope to better comprehend
both the apparent need for and characteristic failures of some traditional accounts of identiﬁ-
cation and alienation, as well as make clear the action-theoretical debt incurred by those who
would offer an alternative. So, on the one hand, I claim that a commitment to an event-causal
conception of agency, which would analyse agency in terms of the causal potency of psycho-
logical states and events, appears to render mandatory a style of account of identiﬁcation and
alienation which is beset by insoluble difﬁculties: the hierarchical model offered by Harry
Frankfurt and Michael Bratman.2 On the other, I claim that an attractive alternative style of
account of the distinction – that of Richard Moran – rests on claims about agency which
seem incompatible with the event-causal conception of agency. Whilst I favour the Moranian
view,whether it can be fully defended and a non-event-causal conception of agency developed
I leave for another occasion.
In Section 2, I give an example of alienation to get a ﬁx on the distinction, and then in
Sections 3–4 I introduce the hierarchical accounts of Bratman and Frankfurt. I argue that
both accounts fall foul of what I call the Authority Problem, and in Section 5 I trace the need
for a hierarchical account to the event-causal conception of agency. Rather than arguing
against the event-causal conception of agency, however, I explore in Section 6 whether a
modiﬁcation of a later view of Frankfurt’s might provide an account which is compatible
with the event-causal view of agency, but which avoids the Authority Problem.
However, difﬁculties with this modiﬁed view then motivate, in Section 7, an appeal to
Moran’s account of the distinction between identiﬁcation and alienation, which I claim is
incompatible with the event-causal conception of agency. I close in Section 8 by discussing
the broader uses to which accounts of identiﬁcation and alienation have been put by philo-
sophers of action.
2. The distinction between identiﬁcation and alienation
We can imagine a man who has received a strict religious upbringing and who later goes on
to live in a monastery. Say that this person enters into a particularly severe order which
encourages self-ﬂagellation in response to thoughts or feelings of a sexual nature, but
later becomes disillusioned and leaves the monastery. Now this person no longer believes
in God, and neither does he maintain his previous evaluative outlook which condemned his
erotic desires. Nevertheless, we can imagine that he still wants to hurt himself upon enter-
taining an erotic desire, even though he no longer considers there to be any reason for him to
condemn them. When he experiences erotic desires he has to undertake various strategies to
avoid or assuage his desires for self-harm. Perhaps the man knows that if he tries to solve
difﬁcult mathematical problems in his head, he can distract himself from his desires to self-
harm and so prevent their occurring. In this case, the lapsed believer may experience his
desire to hurt himself as an “alien intruder”, or a force which moves him to act “in spite
of himself”, as we might say. There are mental goings on within his psychic life that –
as both we and the sufferer are inclined to put it – are not his.
Important here is the man’s strategic relation to his alienated desires. They feature as
one more part of the world with which he has to contend, or perhaps better, as the
demands of another to which he must listen but which do not seem legitimate to him.
His wanting to hurt himself when he entertains erotic thoughts thus ﬁgures, in a particular
way, as a fact about himself he has to take into account when considering what to do. The
man may avert his eyes when walking past attractive people on the street, not because he
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thinks ﬁnding people attractive is bad, but because the onset of his self-punitive desires may
inﬂict costs on him he does not want to pay. He knows that once he starts desiring to hurt
himself he will suffer the desire’s force, and his desire then provides him with reasons to act
because an instrumental value attaches to the avoidance of the desire. If this man does delib-
erate about whether to hurt himself, it is not because it is, for him, something he thinks it is
good to do. Perhaps if he does not scratch himself a little he knows his desire will grow to
quite unmanageable proportions, whereas if he nips it in the bud in this way it will disap-
pear. Here scratching himself ﬁgures instrumentally as a means by which he can forestall
the onslaught of more troubling desires. The man is thus forced to deliberate about the
avoidance or satisfaction of his alienated desires in a way which renders them similar to
facts about his height or even his external surroundings. His alienated desires constrain
the projects he might sensibly undertake, or ﬁgure as obstacles which must be strategically
overcome. Because the attitudes from which the man is alienated ﬁgure in his deliberations
in much the same way as straightforwardly external matters, the idea that they are beyond
his control seems compelling.3
This man’s self-punitive desires provide an example of attitudes from which an agent is
alienated. In the ﬁrst instance, I understand identiﬁcation simply as the contrasting absence
of any such phenomenology. There is some pre-theoretical reason for this. The language of
alienation derives from ordinary language and how people naturally describe such experi-
ences, whereas the notion of identiﬁcation in ordinary language does not necessarily pick
out the contrary of alienation. We can speak of a person’s identifying with another person,
an institution or a ﬁctional character, but I take it that when Frankfurt introduced the term
identiﬁcation he meant to distinguish a peculiar sense of it which picks out a possible way in
which an agent might relate to their mental life. The only pre-theoretical handle we have on
this technical sense of identiﬁcation is just whatever we mean when we think someone is
not alienated from an attitude.
3. Frankfurt’s ﬁrst account and the Authority Problem
Frankfurt’s initial account of the distinction between alienation and identiﬁcation came in
his paper “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. The keystone of Frankfurt’s
analysis is the concept of a second-order desire:
Someone has a desire of the second-order either when he wants simply to have a certain
desire or when he wants a certain desire to [move him to act]. In situations of the latter
kind, I shall call his second-order desires “second-order volitions” or “volitions of the
second-order”. (1988a, 16)
Frankfurt goes on:
[A person] identiﬁes himself [. . .] through the formation of a second-order volition, with one
rather than the other of his [. . .] ﬁrst-order desires. He makes one of them more truly his own
and, in so doing, he withdraws himself from the other. (1988a, 18)
So, to identify with a desire is for it to be the object of a second-order volition. Frankfurt is
less explicit about alienation, but I take his thought to be that an agent is alienated from their
desire to do something insofar as they want not to want to do that thing. Accounts such as
this have become known as hierarchical accounts because they explain identiﬁcation and
alienation in terms of hierarchies of attitudes.
Frankfurt’s initial account faces an insuperable difﬁculty, however, which was initially
pointed out by Gary Watson.4 The problem is this: second-order volitions are just desires
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with desires as objects; in principle then, a person could fail to identify with them. Why
then should they be privileged in “speaking for the agent”, as it were, and constitute the
agent’s identifying with their psychic life as opposed to being simply more elements
within it? It seems as if the mere presence of a second-order desire cannot be sufﬁcient
for an agent’s identifying with an attitude, for it could “speak for the agent” only if the
agent identiﬁed with it, as is the case with ﬁrst-order desires. This means that in order
for a second-order attitude to constitute an agent’s identifying with a lower order attitude,
according to the hierarchical account of identiﬁcation, it must be the object of a still higher
order attitude. But then a vicious regress ensues because an agent’s identifying with an
attitude presupposes an inﬁnite hierarchy of higher order attitudes; identiﬁcation then
seems impossible.
This problem, which I call the Authority Problem, actually comes in the form of a
dilemma. We may ask: in virtue of what does a particular psychic item represent the
agent, and so constitute their identifying with an object attitude? As we might put it,
what confers authority on psychic items of that sort?5 The problem arises if the psychic
item in question is one from which an agent could be alienated. For then either the item
in question must be identiﬁed with in order that it represent the agent, and so explicate
how the object attitude of that item is itself something the agent identiﬁes with, or it
need not be. If the former horn is taken, the account of identiﬁcation is landed in a
regress: in order for any given instance of the relevant psychic item to constitute an
agent’s identifying with an attitude, an antecedent item of the relevant sort’s being
related to it will be presupposed, and so on ad inﬁnitum. If the second horn is taken,
however, it will be unclear how the item can account for an agent’s identifying with the
object attitude. It will seem arbitrary to insist that these items “speak for the agent” if
they may do so even if the agent does not identify with them. For if such items can
“speak for the agent” even whilst the agent does not identify with them, then on what
grounds do the ﬁrst-order attitudes require being identiﬁed with in order to count as “the
agent’s own”? In failing to insist that these states must be identiﬁed with, this horn of
the dilemma undercuts the idea that psychic items “speak for the agent” only if the agent
identiﬁes with them. For it allows that states with which the agent is not identiﬁed may
well “speak for the agent” too.
4. Bratman’s account
Bratman’s account of identiﬁcation, like Frankfurt’s, is hierarchical: he seeks to elucidate
the idea of an agent’s identifying with an attitude in terms of some higher order attitude
which takes the ﬁrst as an object. The nub of Bratman’s proposed solution to the Authority
Problem is the claim that the psychic items constitutive of an agent’s identiﬁcation with an
object attitude count as such because they constitute, in part, the agent’s literal identity over
time. These items “speak for the agent” because they contribute to an agent’s persistence
over time, given a broadly Lockean understanding of personal identity.
The relevant psychic items to which Bratman appeals are what he calls “plans and
policies”, which he says “induce organization and coordination by way of continuities
and connections [amongst one’s psychic life]”.6 So, he claims, they are well placed to
play a constituting role in maintaining the kinds of psychic ties which create a
Lockean identity of person over time. Some examples he cites are “a policy of develop-
ing and supporting a strong concern with honesty in writing, or of trying to be more
willing to be playful or less inclined to be impatient with others”, and he calls these
“self-governing” policies.7
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Of course, Bratman has a well-developed account of what is involved in a ﬁrst-order
attitude’s ﬁguring as the object of a self-governing policy. His idea is that self-governing
policies support the to-be-identiﬁed-with desires as functioning in a particular way. The
way he suggests is that of “end-setting”, where this is characterized thus:
[A] desire for E functions as end-setting for practical reasoning when that desire motivates by
way of a process of practical reasoning that appeals to E as justifying end. (2002, 75)8
Bratman claims that it is possible for a desire to function as end-setting without an agent’s
identifying with that desire, but he insists that where a desire’s so functioning is the object a
self-governing policy, the agent will identify with it.9 As with Frankfurt, Bratman is less
explicit about alienation, but I understand him to take an analogous position: an agent is
alienated from an attitude insofar as they have a higher policy in support of its not function-
ing as end-setting in practical reasoning.10
This account of identiﬁcation fails to avoid the Authority Problem, however. The ques-
tion to ask is whether or not one could be alienated from one’s self-governing policy in
support of a given desire’s functioning as end-setting. To avoid the problem, Bratman
needs to show how one could not be alienated from one’s self-governing policies. But
even if self-governing policies can constitute an agent’s identifying with an object attitude
only if they contribute towards the agent’s literal identity, it does not change the fact that the
agent might still be alienated from them. Bratman has guaranteed only that they must con-
tribute towards the agent’s identity (in his sense), not that the agent identiﬁes with them. So
for example, say that I have a desire not to argue with my friends on any occasion: I am very
meek. If Bratman is right, then I can appeal in deliberation to thoughts about not arguing
with my friends as justifying whilst it remain possible that I fail to identify with the
desire to do so. Perhaps upon reﬂection I see that they are taking advantage of me and gen-
erally not respecting me. If so much is possible, though, I do not see how adding a higher
order policy in favour of the desire would amount to my identifying with it; even if it (alleg-
edly) contributes towards my literal identity over time. The higher order policy in support of
the desire may just be entrenched due to years of my being a meek person, such that it has
become formative of my character (in some sense) to treat not arguing with my friends as
end-setting in my practical deliberations.11 Might I not then feel estranged from my policy
to always support that desire? It seems possible that I could suffer from that policy as
forever condemning me to unhealthy and exploitative friendships. The fact that it contrib-
utes to my Lockean identity over time does not seem to guarantee of itself that I shall ident-
ify with the policy. The only sense in which self-governing policies are inalienable, then,
fails to speak to the concerns of the Authority Problem: that sense is the metaphysical
one such that they (allegedly) contribute towards my literal identity, but that is consistent
with an agent’s feeling alienated from them.
Perhaps Bratman would insist that without identifying with a policy it could not consti-
tute one’s literal identity. But the foregoing example surely shows how the kind of disposi-
tions and character traits which could constitute Lockean identity, if any could, are such that
one might feel alienated from them. But in any case, if Bratman is helping himself to the
idea that identiﬁcation is partly constitutive of Lockean identity, then we cannot very
well appeal to the fact that self-governing policies constitute Lockean identity in trying
to avoid the Authority Problem. If we want to avoid the Authority Problem by appealing
to items which constitute one’s literal identity, but then specify that such items can do so
only if one identiﬁes with them, then we shall not be any closer to providing an analysis
of identiﬁcation.
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5. The link between the event-causal conception of agency and hierarchical
accounts of identiﬁcation and alienation
I think we should suspect that the Authority Problem is insoluble as far as hierarchical
accounts of identiﬁcation go. One might, of course, hold out hope that the needed inalien-
able psychic item could be found. But better, I think, would be to raise the question as to
why it seems mandatory to explicate an agent’s relation to their psychic life – as manifested
in the phenomena of alienation and identiﬁcation – in terms of the presence of higher order
psychic states which “speak for them”.
To bring out one line of reasoning which arguably leads to this conclusion, it is worth
returning to a step of Bratman’s account which I suppressed in the foregoing.12 Now, it
looks as if we only have two options when attempting to explicate identiﬁcation and alien-
ation: either we appeal to the activity of the agent directly – perhaps as undertaking special
acts of endorsement and rejection with respect to their mental life; perhaps in some more
nuanced way – or we analyse the phenomena in terms of the obtaining of certain psychic
states and the relations between them.13 Bratman, before settling on the notion of self-
governing policies in support of a desire’s functioning as end-setting, offers this account:
[W]e should understand an agent’s endorsement of a desire in terms, roughly, of a self-govern-
ing policy in favour of the agent’s treatment of that desire as providing a justifying reason in
motivationally efﬁcacious practical reasoning. (2000, 54)
But Bratman worries that appealing to “an agent’s treating something as a reason” in expli-
cating identiﬁcation unhelpfully presupposes the idea of identiﬁcation itself.14 This stems
from his commitments in the philosophy of action. In order for us to be able to think of
some process or occurrence as an agent’s doing something, as opposed to merely happening
in or to them, Bratman thinks it must be one with which the agent identiﬁes. Thus, he writes:
An agent moved by desires of which he is unaware, or on which is he incapable of reﬂecting, or
from whose role in action he is, as we sometimes say, estranged, seems himself less the source
of the activity than a locus of forces. (2001, 312)
He makes the same distinction again this way:
When a person acts because of what she desires, or intends, or the like, we sometimes do not
want to say simply that the pro-attitude leads to action. In some cases we suppose, further, that
the agent is the source of, determines, directs, governs the action and is not merely the locus of
a series of happenings, of causal pushes and pulls. (2001, 311)
Bratman’s thought is that what makes the difference between a mere “series of happenings”
and an instance of agency is that the agent identiﬁes with the motivations which produce the
event in which the action consists.15 This means that to employ the idea of an agent’s treat-
ing something as a reason when explicating identiﬁcation unhelpfully presupposes the idea.
As Bratman sees it, whatever process is involved in treating something as a reason, in order
for it to be an activity on the part of the agent it must be one with which the agent identiﬁes.
We cannot then analyse identiﬁcation in terms of an agent’s treating something as a
reason.16
In the background here is the idea that agency must consist in the causal links between
states and events.17 An action is an event – an arm’s rising, say – which is suitably caused
by some preceding mental occurrences (typically a belief and a desire); likewise, some
process constitutes someone’s thinking something if it is suitably produced by some
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preceding mental goings on. Bratman’s contribution here is the idea that only events caused
by psychic states with which the agent identiﬁes are such as to count as instances of their
agency. In defence of this, one might add that if an action just is the causing of an event by
some preceding mental occurrences, then arguably the causing of an event by mental occur-
rences from which someone is alienated could not constitute an action. If we take the
language of suffering and passivity with respect to alienated mental states seriously, then
it seems there is no room left for the agent when their movements are caused by alienated
states.
Let me summarize the two important claims from the foregoing this way:
The Event-causal Claim: the only viable account of agency is one couched in terms of causal
links between states and events.
The Identiﬁcation Claim: (i) psychological states and events belong to the agent properly
speaking only if the agent identiﬁes with them and (ii) The causation of events by psychologi-
cal states and events constitutes agency properly so-called only if the agent identiﬁes with the
causally efﬁcacious states and events.
It is these claims which make an account of identiﬁcation and alienation in terms of psychic
states and their relations seem mandatory. The Event-causal Claim pushes one towards the
Identiﬁcation Claim, which then precludes one’s accounting for identiﬁcation in terms of
the agent’s doing anything on pain of circularity. Any residual mention of the agent in
one’s account of identiﬁcation involves helping oneself to the idea unanalysed, so the
only illuminating account of identiﬁcation available is one in terms of psychic states and
the relations between them. Thus, instead of talking about the agent’s treating their
desires as reason-giving, Bratman claims that we must understand identiﬁcation in terms
of higher order policies in favour of desires’ functioning in a certain way.
Now, one might attempt to resist the move from the Event-causal Claim to the Identiﬁ-
cation Claim.18 Indeed, the Identiﬁcation Claim seems to render the idea of alienated agency
an oxymoron, which is arguably too strong a conclusion. But even if one rejected the Identi-
ﬁcation Claim, it still seems as if the Event-causal Claim on its own would mandate an
account of identiﬁcation couched solely in terms of psychic states. If one accepts that
agency must consist in the causal links between states and events, then it does not seem
available to one to claim that the mental phenomena which cause actions, when things
go well, are either the objects or manifestations of some unexplained piece of agential
activity. For an adherent of an event-causal conception of agency, then, only an account
of identiﬁcation and alienation in terms of psychic states and their relations is available.
6. A modiﬁed version of Frankfurt’s later account
In the light of the Authority Problem, and in opposition to the hierarchical model, one might
wish to make room for an account of the distinction between identiﬁcation and alienation
which makes a direct appeal to some conception of agential activity. And an argument of the
following form might present itself. If we accept an event-causal conception of agency, then
we must provide a hierarchical account of the distinction between alienation and identiﬁ-
cation. However, as the latter cannot be provided, as per the Authority Problem, we may
argue by modus tollens for an alternative conception of agency.
Now, putting to one side whether there might not be other, moral-psychologically inde-
pendent grounds for denying an event-causal conception of agency, the proposed con-
clusion is surely arrived at too quickly. For the conclusion of the last section was only
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that, given an event-causal conception of agency, an account of the distinction between
alienation and identiﬁcation must be provided in terms of psychic states and the relations
between them. And it might reasonably be thought that there is some leeway here,
between that idea and the more fully articulated idea of a hierarchy of psychic states.
But if there is some purely psychic account of the distinction available, compatible with
an event-causal conception of agency and yet non-hierarchical, then one will not be able
to use the Authority Problem as lever to dislodge the Event-causal Claim.
An attempt in this vein might be made by modifying a later account of Frankfurt’s, in
which he proposed a way of avoiding the Authority Problem that appealed to the notion of
“satisfaction”. Frankfurt claims that being satisﬁed with one’s attitudes requires “no adop-
tion of any cognitive, attitudinal, affective, or intentional stance”. Nor does it
Require the performance of a particular act; and it does not require any deliberate abstention.
Satisfaction is a state of the entire psychic system – a state constituted just by the absence of
any tendency or inclination to alter its condition. (1999, 104)
“Being satisﬁed”, Frankfurt said, “is a matter of simply having no interest in making
changes”,19 although it must not be “unreﬂective”; satisfaction “develops and prevails as
an unmanaged consequence of the person’s appreciation of his psychic condition.”20
Frankfurt then claims that identiﬁcation “is constituted neatly by an endorsing higher-
order desire with which the person is satisﬁed.”21 So, satisfaction with a psychic item at
least seems to entail the absence of some still higher order, countervailing attitude. If
that is right, then identifying with a desire would not generate the regress horn of the Auth-
ority Problem: one could identify with a desire just by its being the object of a second-order
desire concerning which one had no still higher order attitudes.
Now, there are two issues I want to raise for this account. One concerns the fact that it
still insists that identiﬁcation with an attitude depends upon a higher order attitude with the
ﬁrst as its object; considering this will lead to the modiﬁed view which avoids the Authority
Problem without challenging the Event-causal Claim. The second issue concerns the notion
of satisfaction itself; considering this will lead me to introduce a view which once again
threatens the Event-causal Claim.
To begin with the ﬁrst: if I can be satisﬁed with a desire without any higher order desire
for it, but identiﬁcation with an attitude consists in its being the object of a higher order
desire with which I am satisﬁed, then Frankfurt is insisting that I do not need to identify
with my higher order desires in order for them to constitute my identifying with ﬁrst-
order attitudes. But that forces Frankfurt to say that I may not identify with those attitudes
which are to constitute my identifying with my ﬁrst-order attitudes - however we are to
understand satisfaction. But if one can fail to identify with these higher order attitudes,
then can we insist that such attitudes are better placed than ﬁrst-order attitudes to “speak
for the agent”? We seem to be back onto the second horn of the Authority Problem.
Of course, it may be that if an agent is satisﬁed with an attitude, then it can “speak for
them” – regardless of whether the agent identiﬁes with it. But then with satisfaction in play,
one need not insist on cashing out identiﬁcation in terms of higher order attitudes at all. For
why not claim instead that there is generally a presumption in favour of an agent’s satisfac-
tion with their ﬁrst-order attitudes, identiﬁcation consists in that, and therefore that identi-
ﬁcation is simply the “normal case” for ﬁrst-order attitudes? Frankfurt himself later said
Being identiﬁed with the contents of one’s own mind is a very elementary arrangement. [. . .] It
is so natural to us, and as a rule it comes about so effortlessly, that we generally do not notice it
at all. In very large measure, it is simply the default condition. (2006, 8)
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Such an account would concede to the second horn of the Authority Problem that higher
order attitudes are not privileged in “speaking for the agent”. But hierarchies could then
enter as explaining alienation – desires in favour of not being moved by some desire,
say – where there is, once again, simply a defeasible presumption in favour our being sat-
isﬁed with, and so identifying with, those higher order negative attitudes. Frankfurt would
not then have to say that an agent need not, by the theory’s own lights, identify with the
attitudes which constitute their identifying with lower order attitudes: here there are no
higher order attitudes which are so constitutive, and the higher order attitudes which con-
stitute an agent’s being alienated from lower order attitudes are not dependent on still higher
order attitudes for the agent’s identifying with them.
What are the implications of this account? Importantly, the search for the inalienable
psychic item needed to forestall the Authority Problem would not be necessary. One can
be alienated from one’s desires; but there is a standing, though defeasible, presumption
in favour of our identifying with them – a presumption extended to higher order attitudes
when they are invoked to explain alienation. In order to challenge this account – or others
with its shape – it seems one would have to examine, case-by-case, whether the psychic
items offered as explaining alienation really are necessary and sufﬁcient for that. There
would no longer be a single, apparently knock-down argument against psychic hierarchies,
as per the Authority Problem.
So far so good, it might be thought: the Authority Problem has been avoided and we
have not yet seen grounds for moving beyond psychic states and their connections; we
have not, therefore, found a reason for rejecting an event-causal conception of agency.
At this point, however, I think we have to examine the notion of satisfaction itself: my
second concern. Frankfurt insists that satisfaction is “neither deliberately contrived nor
wantonly unselfconscious”,22 but it is far from clear what this amounts to, nor, and impor-
tantly, why we should presume something like it to hold for our attitudes as the “normal
case”. For we might worry with Bratman that one might have no countervailing attitudes
towards one’s attitudes due to “enervation or exhaustion or depression”,23 and that seems
to undermine the thought that mere satisfaction, for all Frankfurt tells us about it, could
be sufﬁcient for an agent’s identifying with an attitude. The conditions for satisfaction,
as merely negative, might be met in ways which intuitively are incompatible with
identiﬁcation.
Given the conception of desire which is operative in the background here, it should not
be surprising that satisfaction appears not to sufﬁce for identiﬁcation. Indeed, with such a
conception, it is hard to see how identiﬁcation could be the norm. So Frankfurt writes:
Our most elementary desires come to us as urges or impulses; we are moved by them, but they
do not as such affect our thinking at all. They are merely psychic rawmaterial. A desire provides
us not with a reason but with a problem – the problem of how to respond to it. (2002a, 184)
Desires here are conceived as a kind of brute psychic given, the agent’s relation to which is
left undecided by the mere presence of the desire itself. So conceived, it is difﬁcult to see
how the mere presence of a collection of desires within an agent will, just as such, sufﬁce
for the agent’s identifying with them – nothing about that rules out failures of identiﬁcation,
as Bratman worries. But then it is difﬁcult to see how it could simply be the normal case that
an agent identiﬁes with their ﬁrst-order attitudes. Surely something further is needed,
beyond the mere presence of the attitudes, in order to secure the idea that an agent identiﬁes
with those attitudes just where they have no countervailing higher order attitudes against
them?
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Perhaps more could be said in favour of the satisfaction proposal, but clearly there can
be no recourse at this stage to higher order attitudes to provide the needed extra – we would
be back with the ﬁrst horn of the Authority Problem. Now, a presumption in favour of an
agent’s identifying with their ﬁrst-order attitudes is certainly an attractive idea, so it would
be natural at this point to challenge Frankfurt’s conception of desire. It seems to me, then,
that Richard Wollheim is right when he urges:
[Our desires] do not present themselves to us, their owners, as simply being what they are for,
and all – innocently, one might say – begging for satisfaction as vociferously as their strength
determines. (1993, 59)
Rather, it is somehow internal to desires that we identify with them – though of course that
can fail. So we should not think of identiﬁcation with a desire as something extra, conferred
upon it in virtue of its relations to other attitudes; we should ﬁnd a way of conceiving desires
which builds in an agent’s identifying with them, at least ordinarily. It is here that I suggest
the work of Richard Moran is helpful. As I read him, he understands desires in terms of a
basic a kind of activity inherent in holding them, which breaks down in alienated cases. The
nature of desire, cashed out in agential terms, secures the presumption in favour of an
agent’s identifying with their ﬁrst-order desires. But then this appeal to an unreduced con-
ception of agential activity jeopardizes, once again, the event-causal conception of
agency.24
7. Moran’s account
Moran argues that when an agent’s attitudes are responsive to their perception of the reasons
for those attitudes we can then see the agent as actively holding those attitudes and that the
agent thereby identiﬁes with them.25 Here the agent’s attitudes are, in a sense which
obviously calls for greater elucidation, dependent on their engagement with their
reasons. By contrast, if an agent harbours an attitude for which they can see no rationale
and which persists even if the face of the agent’s taking their situation to not warrant it,
then the agent is alienated from that attitude. In such a situation, the agent’s attitude can
no longer be taken as a response on their part, but has rather become an obstacle, as it
were, with which they must contend. The crucial point is that an agent identiﬁes with a
desire insofar as they see some value in what the desire is for and the agent’s holding the
desire is responsive to their sense of its being worth holding.
So, for example, when I think I see a dear friend across the street and want to greet them,
usually I identify with the desire. In such a case, the desire would persist just insofar as I
took the approaching person to actually be my friend, and so warrant my wanting to
greet them. If it turned out, in fact, that I had made a mistake and that I did not know
the approaching person, then I would cease, ceteris paribus, wanting to speak with them.
Were I to persist in wanting to greet the stranger, however, even when viewed as such
and in the absence of my taking there to be any good in talking to them, I would feel alie-
nated from that desire. Likewise, the lapsed believer whom I used to introduce the notion of
alienation suffers from attitudes for which he cannot ﬁnd a rationale, even if he can offer
some explanation of them in terms of his psychic history. No reﬂection on the qualities
of his wife, and no reﬂection on the baselessness of his self-punitive desires make any
difference to whether or not he wishes to harm himself.26
This picture does not involve seeing the agent as undertaking special acts of endorse-
ment and rejection with respect to their attitudes, but it arguably does require us to
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understand our attitudes as themselves manifestations of agency - exercises of our rational
capacities. As I read Moran, we identify with attitudes not in virtue of some preceding act;
nor because they are either the object of or caused by some further mental state, but rather
because the attitudes with which we identify are themselves manifestations of our rational
agency. With desires, and in the good case, we should think of them as instances of an
agent’s holding some end as worth achieving or to-be-done.27 On this picture, our attitudes
are themselves understood as exercises of our rational capacities when we identify with
them; and the reasoning agent and their capacities are taken as basic in accounting for
their activity. This then sits at odds with the event-causal conception of agency, for that con-
ception of agency refuses to take as basic the agent, their powers and then to see certain
states or events as the exercises of those powers. Such a conception would not rest
content with the idea that attitudes themselves can be active: whether attitudes enjoy that
status would have to depend on their being related in the right way to further states and
events. Within such a picture, an agent’s identifying with an attitude is factorized into an
attitude plus its relation to something further; as I understand it, the Moranian alternative
refuses such factorization.
How does this relate to the presumption in favour of identiﬁcation which I mentioned in
the last section? The idea of identiﬁcation as responsiveness to reasons takes as the base, or
core case that of an agent’s identifying with their attitudes. Rather than starting with some
ﬁrst-order attitudes and trying to locate the needed extra in order to “build up” to a case of
identiﬁcation – as hierarchical theorists do – this picture sees identiﬁcation as part of the
typical well-functioning of ﬁrst-order attitudes and then “builds down” to alienation, by
saying what is missing in those cases. The norm is reason-responsiveness; that is what alie-
nated cases lack. This picture is available once we allow the rational agent to take centre
stage and recognize their role in the formation and maintenance of ﬁrst-order attitudes. It
is because ﬁrst-order attitudes are typically manifestations of the agent’s activity that the
agent identiﬁes with them; here the activity involved in an agent’s holding attitudes is
the agent’s responding to reasons, which is the agent’s identifying with those attitudes.
In the normal case then, we do not need to add something to ﬁrst-order attitudes to get
to identiﬁcation; it is when the activity constitutive of the normal case breaks down that
something is missing.
From this point of view, we can diagnose why hierarchical theorists have to “build up”
to identiﬁcation, as well as explain the theories’ characteristic ﬂaw: susceptibility to the
Authority Problem. Given their commitments in the philosophy of action, principally to
the event-causal picture, hierarchical theorists have to view the appeal to the agent’s
role with respect to ﬁrst-order attitudes with suspicion. In denying the agent’s role with
respect to ﬁrst-order attitudes, then, these theorists have to go in search of something
extra which will constitute the agent’s relation to their psychic life, as that is manifested
in identiﬁcation and alienation. This is what makes a presumption in favour of identiﬁ-
cation hard to understand on such a view. For our ﬁrst-order attitudes then appear as if
they formed a self-standing array of psychic objects, the agent’s relation to which must
– on pain of appealing to special acts of identiﬁcation and rejection – be captured in
terms of further psychic items. Talk about the agent’s activity with respect to attitudes
comes to seem as if it must be translated into talk about further, higher order attitudes.
Higher order attitudes then need be inalienable to play the agent’s role, and the Authority
Problem ensues.
On the view I favour, the agent’s relating to their psychic life is secured as soon as we
have an agent who responds to reasons. On this model, there is no need to think of the agent
as an inner judge, endorsing or rejecting psychic items as they come up for review. The
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agent’s eye is, in the good case, directed towards the world; and in virtue of the agent’s atti-
tudes’ responsiveness to reasons, the agent’s consideration of their reasons is ipso facto an
assessment of their attitudes. For the agent’s forming, maintaining or revising their attitudes
simply follows from the agent’s engagement with their reasons, which engagement is the
agent’s relating to their psychic life in the form of identiﬁcation.28 It is only when things
have gone wrong that the agent’s attitudes must be approached as self-standing psychic
objects, about which they have to do something.
Finally, it is worth noting that on this account alienation from a desire involves the
agent’s failing to ﬁnd any worth in the desire’s object. Some explicit thought will therefore
be involved in a way which is not mirrored in an agent’s identifying with a desire, which an
agent may hold in response to reasons without any explicit process of reasoning on their
part.29 This asymmetry reﬂects the satisfaction account’s invocation of higher order
desires to explain alienation without, however, necessarily appealing to such states.30
8. The role of the distinction between identiﬁcation and alienation within the
philosophy of action
Before concluding it will be helpful to consider a fairly broad objection to the foregoing
remarks, in order to further bring out the general thrust of the Moranian picture. Some hier-
archical theorists have hoped that the notion of an agent’s identifying with her attitudes can
be used to mark differences between degrees of agency. Perhaps: there are mere happen-
ings, some kinds of sub-intentional activity – arguably instanced by animals and even
humans when at their more thoughtless or alienated – and ﬁnally there is full-blown inten-
tional agency. (Perhaps, too, there is some still higher grade: some kind of perfectly moral
agency.) The idea of an agent’s identifying with an attitude on which she acts could then be
marshalled to mark the difference between, say, animal or alienated agency and the more
fully intentional sort. Thus, Bratman claims that “the idea of ownership of desires earns
its place” by helping us to provide an analysis of human beings’ “more complex forms
of agency”.31 But, so the argument goes, if that is right, then surely a question will similarly
arise about grades of mental agency, and won’t one then need the notion of identiﬁcation to
explicate whatever sort of activity one thinks is involved in holding an attitude for
reasons?32
Something like this, it should be recalled, was a worry of Bratman’s (Section 5). The
point I want to emphasize here is an assumption it makes about the order of explanation
with respect to identiﬁcation and agency. Roughly, for Frankfurt et al. our understanding
of agency and the degrees in which it comes is in some way philosophically problematic;
identiﬁcation is then used to explain what agency, or at least one of its forms, is. In slogan
form: identiﬁcation explains agency. But this puts things back to front, from the point of
view on identiﬁcation and alienation I favour. On that view, agential capacities are taken
for granted and then themselves employed in accounting for the difference between identi-
ﬁcation and alienation; the order of explanation is reversed. In slogan form: agency
explains identiﬁcation.33 It is true that at a suitable level of abstraction we can see the
Moranian account and the Frankfurt-style account as in agreement. As we might incau-
tiously put it, ignoring many essential caveats: in both accounts agency and identiﬁcation
co-vary – at least with respect to mental life. For on a responsiveness-to-reasons account,
when an agent’s attitude is not a manifestation of their rational agency, it is thereby one
from which the agent is alienated. But again, an appeal to an agent’s rational agential
powers is made to explain the distinction between alienation and identiﬁcation, and not
vice versa.
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The philosophical source of these differing attitudes to human agency must be traced, I
think, to different conceptions of nature and what materials we allow ourselves – in line
with some form of naturalism – when accounting for such agency. As Velleman rightly
insists, “[o]ur concept of full-blooded human action requires some event or state of
affairs that owes its occurrence to an agent and hence has an explanation that traces back
to him”.34 But then he goes on to claim that there is an “obstacle to reconciling our con-
ception of agency with the possible realities”:
[O]ur scientiﬁc view of the world regards all events and states of affairs as caused, and hence
explained, by other events and states, or nothing at all. And this view would seem to leave no
room for agents in the explanatory order. (2000b, 129)
Identiﬁcation, cashed out in terms of psychic states, is then understood by Frankfurt et al. to
be part of the project of ﬁtting agents back in to nature, as it were. However, it conceives
nature, though, it seems to me that a Moranian view of identiﬁcation and alienation must
assume that we can make sense of, and ﬁnd the place in nature for, human agency
without our having to reconstruct it out of event-causal resources.35 For that view draws
on a conception of the activity of mental life which resists reconstruction in terms of the
bare existence of psychic states and the relations between them; in Moran’s words “the
concept of the person as a reasoning agent is [. . .] ineliminable”.36 Indeed, from this per-
spective, it will be hard not to agree with Jennifer Hornsby’s verdict that when the
event-causal picture is “the base line for questions in moral psychology, a shape is
imposed on those questions that they should never have been allowed to take on”.37
9. Conclusion
More would need to be said to be said about the details of the Moranian account to offer a
full defence of it. My aim in the foregoing has rather been to emphasize the conﬂict
between what seems to be a promising account of the distinction between identiﬁcation
and alienation and the account of agency which has been taken for granted by other the-
orists in this area. Whether, and how, an event-causal account of agency can be replaced
by an alternative I must leave an open question. Furthermore, how such an account of
agency might be related to the claims about speciﬁcally mental agency must also be
left open. It goes without saying that these are hardly untroubled philosophical waters:
the traditional account of agency opposed to an event-causal one is that of agent-causa-
tion, which has many detractors; and the idea of mental agency has been challenged on
grounds that are arguably independent of any particular conception of agency. The pro-
blems there might be thought to be particularly acute.38 Clearly much more needs to
be said about the nature of mental agency, more overtly physical agency and the relation
between them.
However, what I want to have shown is that there is good reason to look for a non-
hierarchical account of identiﬁcation, and that doing so requires a serious re-assessment
of the metaphysical ground on which much previous moral psychological debate has
been conducted. If I am right, the Authority Problem is endemic to hierarchical analyses
of identiﬁcation and alienation, and the opposing account I considered sits at odds with
an event-causal conception of agency. I am optimistic both that an alternative to an
event-causal conception of agency is available and that this can be extended to mental
agency, thereby illuminating the phenomena of identiﬁcation and alienation in something
like the way Moran suggests. That task, however, must await further treatment.
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Notes
1. Cf. Frankfurt (1988a,1988b,1988c).
2. I only discuss Frankfurt’s ﬁrst and last accounts: (1988a), (1999); and Bratman’s (2000, 2001,
2002) later account. For others, see Frankfurt’s (1988b, 1988c) and Bratman’s (1996).
3. See Harcourt (1998) for a fuller treatment of this aspect of alienation.
4. Watson (2004a).
5. This way of putting things derives from Watson’s question: “[w]hat gives [higher order] voli-
tions any special relation to “oneself”? (2004a, 29). Cf. Bratman (2000), (2001) who also
speaks of agential authority in this context.
6. Bratman (2000, 47).
7. Bratman (2000, 47–48).
8. In fact, the initial speciﬁcation Bratman offers is in terms of a self-governing policy in favour of
the agent’s treating a desire as a reason, but he worries that this would be circular. For ease of
exposition I have jumped straight to Bratman’s ﬁnal formulation. I shall return to his circularity
worry in Section 4.
9. Cf. Bratman (2002, 75). It is questionable whether one could be alienated from a desire which
functioned as end-setting as Bratman characterizes that. I brieﬂy return to this below, see
Note 26.
10. For Bratman’s argument in favour of desires functioning as end-setting, as opposed to Frank-
furt’s idea of their merely moving one to act, see his (2000, 54).
11. That we can use “character” in this sense might complicate any quick route from the notion of
identiﬁcation to an elucidation of the concept of character.
12. Another line of reasoning turns on the thought that someone’s identifying with an attitude is
bound up with their ability to reﬂect on it, and that the formation of higher order attitudes natu-
rally captures this. Whilst I agree with the point about reﬂection, I disagree that it is best under-
stood in terms of hierarchies of attitudes. For helpful discussion see Hieronymi (2009, Section 5).
13. Cf. Bratman (2000, 38–39).
14. Cf. Bratman (1996, 9), (2000, 55, Note 52), (2001, 323), (2002).
15. Cf. Bratman (2000, 38–40), (2001, 312).
16. As noted, Bratman claims that it is possible for a desire to function as end-setting without an
agent’s identifying with that desire, hence avoiding the supposed circularity. Against this one
might ask: Could one appeal to some desired end as justifying, i.e. it function as end-setting,
without one’s treating it as reason-giving? “No”, it seems to me. I relate this to the potential
non-alienability of desires which function as end-setting in Note 26.
17. “States and events” are the usual relata postulated by the so-called “standard story” of action
which has its origins in Davidson’s (1963). For discussion, see Steward (1997).
18. This, in effect, is Mele’s move. Cf. Mele (2003, ch. 10).
19. Frankfurt (1999, 105).
20. Frankfurt (1999, 105).
21. Frankfurt (1999, 105).
22. Frankfurt (1999, 105).
23. Bratman (1996, 7).
24. I should mention two other historically important accounts.
First, Velleman (2000a, 2000b). I do not discuss this because it is not clear to me whether Velle-
man wants to offer an account of identiﬁcation or preclude the need for one. Cf. Velleman
(2000b, 137).
Secondly, there is Watson’s (2004a) initial counter-proposal to Frankfurt’s (1988a). I do not
discuss this because he repudiated the account in his (2004b). I think the spirit of Watson’s
view is maintained in Moran’s, however. See Section 6 below.
256 Alec Hinshelwood
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 03
:52
 27
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
25. Moran (2001, 2002). Raz (1997) and Mayr (2012) argue for similar positions.
26. Further to Notes 9 and 16 then, it seems to me that an agent identiﬁes with an attitude to the
extent that they treat its object as reason-giving, which seems to me the same as its functioning
as end-setting. I therefore think that Bratman is wrong to claim that one could fail to identify
with an attitude that so functioned, but also that this counts against his theory more generally.
For a desire’s functioning as end-setting just is the attitude’s being actively held by the agent in
response to reasons. The circularity Bratman adverts to is an expression of the fact that the good
account of identiﬁcation he discovers requires agential resources that go beyond an event-causal
conception, and so could hardly be put to use in providing such an account.
27. This is to adapt Boyle’s understanding of Moran’s claims about the role of agency in self-knowl-
edge to Moran’s claims about identiﬁcation and alienation. Cf. Boyle (2011a, 2011b, 2011c).
28. Such attitudes would not be “wantonly unselfconscious”, as Frankfurt claimed desires with
which one is satisﬁed must not be. Cf. Moran (2001) and Ro¨dl (2007).
29. Cf. Moran (2002, 198).
30. I think it is plausible that alienation from an attitude will almost always result in a higher order
negative attitude towards it, but this would be explained by its persistence in the face of the
agent’s recognising the worthlessness of its object.
31. Bratman (2003, 222, Note 3).
32. Frankfurt appears to make an argument of just this sort against Moran in his response (2002b) to
Moran’s (2002).
33. Compare Steward (2012, 60, 148).
34. Velleman (2000b, 127).
35. There have been some recent views of agency which take an event-causal conception of nature
to task. Cf. Lowe (2010), Mayr (2012) and Steward (2012).
36. Moran (2001, 193).
37. Hornsby (2004, 2–3).
38. Cf. Strawson (2003).
Notes on contributor
Alec Hinshelwood is a PhD student at University College London. His interests are in the philosophy
of mind and ethics, but especially in their intersection in the philosophy of action. He is also interested
in Aristotle, Kant, Marx, and Freud.
References
Boyle, M. 2011a. “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 85 (1):
223–241.
Boyle, M. 2011b. “‘Making Up your Mind’ and the Activity of Reason.” Philosophers’ Imprint 11
(17): 1–24.
Boyle, M. 2011c. “Active Belief.” In Belief and Agency, edited by D. Hunter, 119–147. Calgary:
University of Calgary Press.
Bratman, M. 1996. “Identiﬁcation, Decision, and Treating as a Reason.” Philosophical Topics 24 (2):
1–18.
Bratman, M. 2000. “Reﬂection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.” The Philosophical
Review 109 (1): 35–61.
Bratman, M. 2001. “Two Problems About Human Agency.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
New Series 101 (1): 309–326.
Bratman, M. 2002. “Hierarchy, Circularity, and Double Reduction.” In Contours of Agency, edited by
S. Buss and L. Overton, 65–85. London: MIT Press.
Bratman, M. 2003. “A Desire of One’s Own.” The Journal of Philosophy 100 (5): 221–242.
Davidson, D. 1963. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” The Journal of Philosophy 60 (23): 685–700.
Frankfurt, H. 1988a. “Freedom of theWill and the Concept of a Person.” Chap. 2 in The Importance of
What We Care About. Cambridge: CUP.
Frankfurt, H. 1988b. “Identiﬁcation and Externality.” Chap. 5 in The Importance of What We Care
About. Cambridge: CUP.
The Relations Between Agency, Identiﬁcation, and Alienation 257
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 03
:52
 27
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
Frankfurt, H. 1988c. “Identiﬁcation and Wholeheartedness.” Chap. 12 in The Importance of What We
Care About. Cambridge: CUP.
Frankfurt, H. 1999. “The Faintest Passion.” Chap. 8 in Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge:
CUP.
Frankfurt, H. 2002a. “Reply to Thomas Scanlon.” In Contours of Agency, edited by S. Buss and
L. Overton, 184–188. London: MIT Press.
Frankfurt, H. 2002b. “Reply to Richard Moran.” In Contours of Agency, edited by S. Buss and
L. Overton, 218–226. London: MIT Press.
Frankfurt, H. 2006. Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Harcourt, E. 1998. “Mill’s ‘Sanctions’, Internalization and the Self.” European Journal of Philosophy
6 (3): 318–334.
Hieronymi, P. 2009. “TwoKinds of Agency.” InMental Actions, edited by L. O’Brien andM. Soteriou,
138–162. Oxford: OUP.
Hornsby, J. 2004. “Agency and Actions.” In Agency and Action, edited by J. Hyman and H. Steward,
1–24. Cambridge: CUP.
Lowe, E. J. 2010. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford: OUP.
Mayr, E. 2012. Understanding Human Agency. Oxford: OUP.
Mele, A. 2003. Motivation and Agency. Oxford: OUP.
Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Princeton
University Press.
Moran, R. 2002. “Frankfurt on Identiﬁcation: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life.” In Contours of
Agency, edited by S. Buss and L. Overton, 189–217. London: MIT Press.
Raz, J. 1997. “The Active and the Passive.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
Volumes 71: 211–227.
Ro¨dl, S. 2007. Self-Consciousness. London: Harvard University Press.
Steward, H. 1997. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford: OUP.
Steward, H. 2012. A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: OUP.
Strawson, G. 2003. “Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaneity.” Proceeding of the
Aristotelian Society New Series 103 (1): 227–256.
Velleman, J. D. 2000a. “Introduction.” Chap. 1 in The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: OUP.
Velleman, J. D. 2000b. “What Happens When Someone Acts?” Chap. 6 in The Possibility of Practical
Reason. Oxford: OUP.
Watson, G. 2004a. “Free Agency.” Chap. 1 in Agency and Answerability. Oxford: OUP.
Watson, G. 2004b. “Free Action and Free Will.” Chap. 6 in Agency and Answerability. Oxford: OUP.
Wollheim, R. 1993. “The Good Self and the Bad Self.” Chap. 3 in The Mind and Its Depths. London:
Harvard University Press.
258 Alec Hinshelwood
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 03
:52
 27
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
